Abstract-Converting a secure group key agreement protocol into password-based setting is not a trivial task. The security of a password-based scheme hinges on preventing dictionary attack that enables an adversary to take advantage of the low entropy of human memorable passwords. In this paper, we make a case study considering the constant round group key agreement protocol DB proposed by DuttaBarua, which is a simple variant of Burmester-Desmedt protocol BD. We present a simple and elegant contributory group key agreement in password-based setting derived from the protocol DB. We discuss several issues regarding the difficulties of converting this DB protocol into password-based setting. We have made several modifications in the protocol DB and then enhance it to password-based setting. The security of the proposed scheme against dictionary attacks is in the ideal cipher model under Decision Diffie-Hellman ( 
I. INTRODUCTION
Password-Based Group Key Agreement: A passwordbased group key agreement (GKA) protocol allows a group of users, who share only a low-entropy humanmemorable password and communicating over an insecure public network, to agree upon a high-entropy session key among themselves. This session key can later be used to implement multi-cast sessions.
It is common knowledge that a user cannot remember long random numbers and he has to store a large secret, if necessary, into his system. This imposes an extra security burden and thus introduces a new point of weakness. Password-based setting seems to be a more realistic scenario and convenient to use as they do not require the use of more specialized hardware for storing or generating secret keys. The users simply remember a relatively lowentropy easily memorable password, say a 4 digit PIN number or a 6 character string. Also password-based GKA enables to establish a session key in the absence of public key infrastructures or pre-distributed symmetric keys and greatly simplifies the setup of distributed applications, for instance, in a setup where the networking of all the devices are attached to a human.
There are several mission-critical applications of password-based group key agreement protocols in military and emergency rescue operations. Also these protocols are suitable for commercial applications like conferencing, meeting and personal networking.
On the other hand, password-based protocols are always subject to password-guessing attacks due to the low entropy of the passwords, where the attacker recovers the password and uses it to impersonate the legitimate user. In case of a failure, he can try with a different password guess and erase the previous guess. In on-line guessing attack, the adversary needs to be present and interact with the system during his attempt to impersonate a user. Such attacks cannot be completely ruled out for a real world adversary, but the damage caused by such attacks can be mitigated. The goal of password-based protocols is to restrict the adversary's capability to the on-line case by limiting the the number of failed login attempts or imposing a minimum time interval between failed attempts.
A more serious threat against password-based protocols is off-line exhaustive search attack, also known as dictionary attack. Since the passwords are drawn from a relatively small and easily generated dictionary, the attacker may run through all the possible passwords in order to obtain partial information and to maximize his success probability in the off-line case. By off-line exhaustive search, the attacker may significantly reduce the number of password candidates. Low entropy feature of passwords makes the off-line exhaustive search attack very damaging as the attacker may get non-negligible chance of winning. A secure password-based protocol should resist at least this attack.
Our Contribution: The design of key agreement in password-based setting has been devoted much less attention in group setting and there is certainly a need for significant theoretical progress. It seems to be a nontrivial task to convert any GKA to password-based setting and establish strong provable security guarantees without making idealized assumptions.
In this paper, we address the problem of converting a provably authenticated group key agreement into a password-based group key agreement. We make a case study considering the GKA protocol proposed by Dutta-Barua in [15] . They presented a constant round group key agreement protocol (DB), similar to BurmesterDesmedt [14] , [22] group key agreement (BD). We enhance the DB protocol into a password based GKA. We discuss several issues regarding the difficulties of converting this DB protocol in password-based setting. The straight-forward conversion of DB protocol by replacing the signature scheme by a symmetric encryption scheme using the password as secret key does not enable the protocol to resist off-line dictionary attacks due to presence of several redundancies in the communication. We analyze this naive approach in a length. To remove these redundancy, we make several modifications in the unauthenticated (version of DB) protocol presented in [15] and then apply encryption-based authentication mechanism using the password as a part of secret key to transform it into a secure password-based protocol that withstand dictionary attack. This yields our passwordbased scheme with security against dictionary attack in the ideal cipher model under DDH assumption.
On a more positive note, proposed protocol is efficient in terms of both computation and communication power as compared to the protocol of Bresson et al. [13] . The number of rounds required for our protocol is only 2. Each group member in the protocol performs at most 3 modular exponentiations, 2n multiplications and/or divisions, 2 encryptions and n + 1 decryptions. Our proposed scheme being of constant round, the cost of computation does not linearly grow with the increase in the number of participants. A conference version of this work has already been published in preliminary form in [17] . The current manuscript is an extended version.
II. SURVEY ON PREVIOUS WORK
The area of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols has been the subject of a vast amount of work in the last few years due to its practical aspects. While the majority of the work deals with different aspects of 2-party key exchange [6] , [9] , [11] , [18] - [20] , only a few take into account the group key establishment with n > 2 participants, and there is a need for significant theoretical progress.
In the 2-party case, perhaps the most well known Diffie-Hellman variant is the family of Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocols by Bellovin and Merritt [7] that deals with off-line dictionary attacks for the first time. This work is very influential and became the basis for much future work in the area. Following it, a number of protocols for password-based key exchange have been proposed [20] , [21] , security of which are based on heuristic arguments. There are two proposals of formal models for password-based key exchange. One by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [6] which is based on [4] , [5] and a second by Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel [9] following [26] . Bellare et al. proposed a 2-party password-based protocol in [6] . Bresson et al. [12] examined the security of 2-party AuthA password-authenticated key exchange protocol standardized by IEEE P1363 Study Group. The security of all these schemes are both in the random oracle and the ideal cipher model. Using the multi-party simulatibility technique, Boyko et al. [9] and MacKenzie et al. [25] presented protocols which are secure in the random oracle model. Goldrich and Lindell [19] provided a protocol based on general assumptions and prove its security in the standard security model of [9] . Independent of this work, Katz, Ostrovsky and Yung [23] suggested a highly efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol in the common reference string model. Gennaro and Lindell [18] further extended this work using more general smooth projective hash function primitives.
An extension of the 2-party case in [6] to multi-party setting is presented by Bresson et al. [13] . In [10] , they proposed another password-based group key exchange protocol. These constructions are secure in the ideal cipher model and the total number of rounds is linear in the number of players, making the schemes impractical for large groups. Recently, several constant round passwordbased group key exchange protocols have been proposed in the literature by [2] , [16] , [24] which are quite efficient and are based on the Burmester-Desmedt [14] , [22] group key agreement protocol, but their security analysis usually require the random oracle and/or ideal cipher models. Recently, two new constant round password-based group key exchange protocols have been proposed independently and concurrently by Abdalla et al. [3] and Bohli et al. [8] with proof of security in the standard model. More recently, Abdalla et al. [1] described a compiler that transforms any provably secure 2-party key establishment into a provably secure authenticated group key establishment with 2 or more rounds of communication in the common reference string model.
III. SECURITY MODEL
Now we briefly describe the formal security model of Bellare et al. [6] as standardized by Bresson et al. [12] , [13] and refer the reader to [6] , [12] , [13] for more details.
A protocol P for password-based group key agreement assumes that there is a set P = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } of n users (n is fixed), who share a low entropy secret password pw drawn uniformly from a small dictionary of size N . The adversary is given control over all communication in the external network. We assume that users do not deviate from the protocol and adversary never participates as a user in the protocol. This adversarial model allows concurrent execution of the protocol among n users. The interaction between the adversary A and the protocol participants occur only via oracle queries, which model the adversary's capabilities in a real attack. These queries are as follows (Π -
This query reflects the adversary's ability to passively eavesdrop on honest execution of password-based group key agreement protocol among unused instances Π i1 U1 , . . . , Π in Un and outputs the transcript of the execution. A transcript consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.
-Reveal(U, i) : This unconditionally outputs session key sk i U that has previously been accepted by instance Π i U . If the session key is not accepted, a value NULL is returned.
-Corrupt(U ) : A gets back from this query pw, but does not get any internal data on U .
-Test(U, i) : A bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. The adversary is given sk We define the session identity sid
Un are involved in the session to agree upon a common key. The session identity uniquely identifies a session. Note that all the instances involved in a session have same session identity. We also assume that an instance of a user participates in at most one session. This means that the session identities of an instance for different sessions are mutually disjoint. We also define a boolean function acc 
The Send, Execute, Reveal and Corrupt queries are asked several times, but Test query is asked only once and on a fresh instance. We say that an instance nor its partners have been asked a Reveal query (i.e. the adversary queried neither Reveal(U, i) nor Reveal(U , j) with (U , j) ∈ sid i U , U ∈ P). Finally, adversary outputs a guess bit b . Such an adversary is said to win the game if b = b where b is the hidden bit used by the Test oracle. Let Succ denote the event that the adversary A wins the game for a protocol P . We define Adv A,P := |2 Prob[Succ] − 1| to be the advantage of the adversary A in attacking the protocol P where the probability space is over all the random coins of the adversary and all the oracles. We denote by Adv AKA P (t, q E , q S ) the maximum advantage of any adversary attacking protocol P , running in time t and making q E calls to the Execute oracle and q S calls to the Figure 1 . An execution of the protocol DB among n users;
Send oracle. We adopt the following definition given by GennaroLindell [18] for security of password-based key agreement protocols against dictionary attack: Definition 3.2: A password based group key agreement protocol P is secure against dictionary attack if for every dictionary D,
where is a negligible function in the security parameter l of the system.
IV. PROTOCOL
Suppose a set of n ≥ 3 users P = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } share a low entropy secret password pw drawn uniformly from a small dictionary of size N and wish to establish a high entropy common session key among themselves. We consider the users U 1 , . . . , U n participating in the protocol are on a ring and U i−1 , U i+1 are respectively the left and right neighbors of U i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with U 0 = U n , U n+1 = U 1 and U n+i is taken to be U i . Quite often we identify a user U i with his instance Π di Ui (for some unique integer d i that is session specific) during a protocol execution. We denote by A|B the concatenation of A, B.
Let G = g be a multiplicative group of some large prime order q and G = G \ {1}. Then G = {g x |x ∈ Z * q }. The password pw shared among the members of the group is used as a part of key for encryption/decryption. We use a secure block cipher (E k , D k ) where E k is a keyed permutation over a set S, D k is the inverse of E k and k is the key for encryption/decryption drawn from a key space of size N . The set S is of the form S = {U |d|t|X : User U with instance number d sends t th message X ∈ G}.
A. DB : Unauthenticated GKA of [15] The unauthenticated protocol DB presented in [15] involves two rounds and a key computation phase. The protocol is executed as follows among n users U 1 , . . . , U n .
(Round 1) Each user
Ui chooses randomly a private key x i ∈ Z * q , computes X i = g xi and sends X i to his neighbors
and sends Y i to the rest of the users.
3. (Key Computation) Finally in the key computation phase,
as follows making use of his own right key K
Otherwise, U i has correct right keys of all the users. U i computes the session key sk Figure 1 illustrates the protocol.
Complexity : Each user computes 3 exponentiations (one in round 1 and two in round 2) and at most 2n − 2 multiplications (n − 1 multiplications for recovery of all right keys and n − 1 multiplications for session key computation).
B. KeyAgree : Modified Version of Protocol DB
The unauthenticated protocol KeyAgree described in this section is the basis of our password-based scheme (presented in the subsequent subsection) and is obtained by introducing certain modifications to the protocol DB.
Like DB protocol, this protocol also involves two rounds and a key computation phase. An honest execution of the protocol proceeds as follows among user instances Π i |X i to his neighbors U i−1 , U i+1 . In addition, user U n sends T n = str (1) n |X n to other participants involved in the session.
(Round 2) After this communication round is over,
i+1 |X i+1 from U i+1 and T n = str (1) n |X n from U n . User U i aborts the protocol if any two of X i−1 , X i and X i+1 are same which take place with negligible probability. Else U i extracts d n and computes his left key
and sends T i = str (2) i |X i to the rest of the users while user U n remains passive (i.e. sends nothing) in the second round. We note that the right key of U i is same as the left key of U i+1 .
3. (Key Computation) Finally in the key computation phase, U i computes K Figure 2 . An execution of the protocol KeyAgree among n users,
i |g x i in round 1 and str
We now explore certain redundancies in the transmitted messages present in the protocol DB [15] which we removed in the protocol KeyAgree by incorporating certain check steps and thereby aborting the protocol if such a situation occurs. Presence of any such redundancy in KeyAgree will cause the password-based scheme (described in the subsequent section) vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks.
(a) Unlike DB protocol, each user U i in KeyAgree, after first round communication, checks if any two of X i−1 , X i and X i+1 are same and if so aborts the protocol.
Case (i):
which in turn yields a redundancy X i = 1. Case (ii):
x i x i−1 . Now if in addition, it happens to be the case that X i−2 = X i+1 (i.e. x i−2 = x i+1 , probability of which is very small for two honest users U i−2 and U i+1 ), then X i−1 X i = 1, another possible redundancy in the transmitted messages of the protocol DB. An active adversary may interleave the messages during the protocol execution and manipulate the transmitted messages to create such a redundancy as follows: adversary simply replaces X i+1 by a copy of X i−2 (that he obtains by interleaving the protocol transmission) in the first round communication.
Case (iii): X i = X i+1 : Arguing in a similar way as in case (ii), if X i−1 = X i+2 (i.e. x i−1 = x i+2 , probability of which is negligible), then one obtains the redundancy relation X i X i+1 = 1. This situation can be created by an active adversary by replacing X i+2 by a copy of X i−1 at hand in the first round communication.
(b)
In the second round of KeyAgree, the n-th user remains passive, i.e. does not participate in the communication, whereas in DB protocol, all users U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends X i to the rest of the participants yielding a relation 
Communications : Ui sends E pw|Ui (Ti) to Ui−1, Ui+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 where U0 = Un, Un+1 = U1 and Un sends E pw|Un (Tn) to U1, U2, U3, . . . , Un−1
Ui aborts the protocol if
i |Xi
Un remains passive (sends nothing) in this round
Ui computes his session key sk
and sets his session identity sid di Ui = {(U1, d1), . . . , (Un, dn)} Figure 3 . An execution of the protocol P − KeyAgree among n users,
i |g x i in round 1 and encryption of str
under the encryption key pw|U i ; U i aborts if any two of g x i−1 , g x i ; g x i+1 are same; Un sends nothing in round 2; the session key is
. . X n = 1. We are essentially removing this redundancy from the transmitted messages in the protocol KeyAgree by restricting U n from communicating in the second round.
An active adversary, manipulating the messages exchanged during protocol execution, may be able to create other kind of redundancies. So while transforming the unauthenticated protocol DB into password-based setting, we should pay careful efforts to make an active adversary unable to get any advantage in guessing the password offline. This is a non-trivial task.
Figure 4. Naive password-based approach: a straight-forward conversion of the protocol DB to password-based setting among n users;
in round 2; the session key is sk
We now present our password-based group key agreement protocol P − KeyAgree that is obtained by modifying the protocol KeyAgree introducing encryption-based authentication mechanism with the password pw as a part of the secret key. The protocol proceeds as follows among
Un . An execution of the protocol among n users is shown in Figure 3 .
Let str
In the first round, each user U i chooses randomly a private key
i |X i using pw|U i as secret key to obtain Y i = E pw|Ui (T i ) and sends Y i to his neighbors U i−1 , U i+1 . In addition, user U n sends Y n to other participants involved in the session. 
and sends Y i to the rest of the users in the second round. U n remains passive (i.e. sends nothing) in this round. We note that right key of U i is same as the left key of U i+1 .
3. (Key Computation) Each user U i on receiving Y j from U j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, decrypts Y j using pw|U j as the decryption key to recover X j and extracts instance number d j . User U i then computes K 
V. REDUNDANCIES AND SECURITY ISSUES
The procedure P − KeyAgree is obtained by modifying the unauthenticated protocol KeyAgree by introducing encryption-based authentication mechanism. Note that each user U i uses pw|U i as encryption key. Only those users who have the knowledge of pw, would be able to decrypt the encrypted messages.
If instead, we apply encryption-based mechanism with pw as the encryption key for user U i directly to the protocol DB of [15] (see Figures 3, 4) , then this does
Epw(
): round 2 Figure 5 . Dictionary attack to the password-based protocol in Figure 4 ; U i can make use of the following redundancies for off-line dictionary attack where the transmitted messages over the public network are encryptions of X i = g x i and
not yield a secure password-based protocol and one can mount an off-line dictionary attack as follows: Observe that X 1 X 2 . . . X n = 1. This redundancy enables an adversary to make the protocol vulnerable to dictionary attacks by guessing the password off-line and verifying whether the product of decrypted values in the second round communication is 1. If so, the adversary's guess for password is correct. To prevent such attacks, we remove the redundancy in protocol KeyAgree by keeping U n inactive in this round. As a result, the key computation is appropriately modified. These are the points where the procedure KeyAgree differs from the unauthenticated scheme DB of [15] .
Note that the protocol KeyAgree is aborted if
. This step is essential to disable an adversary from mounting offline password guessing attack, because if the protocol proceeds with K L i = K R i for some i, then X i = 1 (see Figure 4 ) and the corresponding publicly transmitted value is simply the encryption of a constant string. By maintaining a list, the attacker can exhaustively search for the password.
Also the protocol KeyAgree is aborted if X i = X i−1 or X i = X i+1 . As discussed earlier in Section IV-B, an active adversary may manipulate the transmitted messages during protocol execution by Send query so that X i−1 X i = 1 (adversary simply replaces in the first round the ciphertext of U i+1 by the ciphertext of U i−2 in the same round) or X i X i+1 = 1 (adversary replaces the ciphertext of U i+2 in the first round by the ciphertext of U i−1 in the same round). Now if the encryption-based mechanism uses pw as the encryption key instead of pw|U i for user U i (see Figure 4) , then an active adversary in the on-line phase may manipulate the messages as described above, search exhaustively for the password by checking X i−1 X i = 1 or X i X i+1 = 1 and thus mounts an off-line dictionary attack. To resist these type of manipulation-based redundancies, the encryption by user U i is done using pw|U i as the secret key instead of pw. U with instance number d sends t th message X ∈ G}. Proof : Let A be an adversary which attacks the password-based protocol PAP. Using this we construct an adversary A which attacks the unauthenticated protocol UP. Adversary A uses a list tlist. It stores pairs of session IDs and transcripts in tlist. Adversary A draws a password pw from the set of all possible passwords to initialize the real attack and gives all the instances of users to A in order to cover concurrent execution of the protocol PAP.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Suppose Encrypt is the event that A makes a Send query on a message that is encrypted by A itself by guessing the password. A simulates the encryption and decryption queries of A by maintaining two lists elist and dlist (initially empty) as follows, each of size at most q E and all the other oracle queries of A are answered by A using its own queries to the Execute oracle.
-Encryption query: For an encryption query E k|U (X) such that a record (δ, k|U, X, Λ, Y ) appears in elist (δ is either 0 or 1 and Λ is either E or D), the answer is Y . Otherwise, a random ciphertext Y ∈ S of length |X| is chosen and the record (δ, k|U, X, E, Y ) is added to elist where δ ∈ {0, 1}. If the query comes from the simulator, δ is set to be 0; else the query is directly asked by the adversary and δ is set to be 1.
-Decryption query: For a decryption query D k|U (Y ) such that a record (δ, k|U, X, Λ, Y ) appears in elist (δ is either 0 or 1 and Λ is either E or D), the answer is X. Otherwise, X ∈ S of length |Y | is chosen randomly. The record (k|U, Y, D, X) is added to dlist and the record (0, k|U, X, D, Y ) is added to elist. Note that a record (k|U, Y, D, X) appears in dlist if and only if D k|U (Y ) is asked first before the corresponding encryption query. Now suppose there exists a record of the form (1, pw|U i , X, * , Y ) in elist such that A makes a Send query on Y . This means that the encryption query E pw|Ui (X) is asked first before the corresponding decyption query (otherwise, elist will contain a record of the form (0, pw|U i , X, * , Y ) instead). Consequently, the record (pw|U i , Y, D, X) does not appear in dlist. This implies A gets the encryption capability by guessing the password andthe event Encrypt occurs.
Suppose Collision is the event that the permutation property (bijection) of block cipher (E k|U , D k|U ) does not hold. Now since the encryption and decryption lists are at most of size q E , the probability that the permutation property of block cipher does not hold is at most
If ever the event Bad occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, A outputs whatever bit is eventually output by A . Note that since the password pw is selected by A, it can detect occurrence of the event Encrypt. We provide details of oracle simulations below.
-Execute queries: Suppose A makes a query Execute({ (U 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (U n , d n )}). It receives as output a transcript T of an execution of UP. It appends (S, T ) to tlist. Adversary A then expands the transcript T for the unauthenticated protocol UP into a transcript T for the password-based protocol PAP according to the modification described in Section IV-C. A is able to do this since the password pw is chosen by A itself. A then returns T to A .
-Send queries: The first send query that A makes to an instance is to start a new session. We will denote such queries by Send 0 queries. To start a session among unused instances Π d1 U1 , . . . , Π dn Un , the adversary has to make the send queries in any order:
. When all these queries have been made, A sets S = { (U 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (U n , d n )} and makes an Execute query to its own execute oracle. It receives a transcript T in return and stores (S, T ) in the list tlist. Let us denote the send queries of first and second round by Send 1 and Send 2 respectively. Note that Send 0 and Send 2 queries have no output. Assuming that the event Bad does not occur, any subsequent Send query (i.e., after a Send 0 query) to an instance Π i U is on a properly encrypted message. Note since Encrypt does not occur, any attempt by A to encrypt and make a Send query will be detected and the protocol aborted. Adversary A would not be able to copy a correct message of a user U k and make a Send query on behalf of U l (l = k) as this would also be detected. So the Send query to Π i U is on a properly encrypted message. A now performs the action to be done by Π i U in the password-based protocol. This is done in the following manner: A first finds the unique entry (S, T ) in tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. Such a unique entry exists for each instance by assumption. A decrypts the current incoming messages. Note that A can decrypt as he knows the password pw. From the transcript T , adversary A finds the appropriate message, encrypts it to form the next public information with appropriate secret key of the form pw|U to be output by Π 
At this point the transcript T in which Π i U participates has already been defined. Now A finds the unique pair (S, T ) in tlist such that (U, i) ∈ S. Assuming that the event Bad does not occur, T is the unique unauthenticated transcript which corresponds to the transcript T . Then A makes the appropriate Reveal or Test query to one of the instances involved in T and returns the result to A .
As long as Bad does not occur, the above simulation for A is perfect. Whenever Bad occurs, adversary A aborts and outputs a random bit. So Prob A ,PAP [Succ|Bad] = 1 2 . Using this, we obtain Adv A,UP ≥ Adv A ,PAP −Prob [Bad] .
The total number of Execute queries made by A is at most q E + q S /n, where q E is the number of Execute queries made by A . Also since Adv A,UP ≤ Adv KA UP (t , q E + q S /n) by assumption, we obtain: Adv The event Encrypt occurs whenever a Send(U, i, Y ) query is asked by the adversary A where a record of the form (1, pw|U, X, * , Y ) appears in elist. We note that A may ask at most q S Send queries and so is able to build at most q S data (encryptions) by itself. Hence at most q S passwords it might have tried in the on-line guessing. Moreover, as long as the exponents from Z * q chosen by the users are random, the plaintexts to be encrypted are completely indistinguishable from random plaintexts drawn from the domain of the encryption function from the point of view of A . Hence an off-line exhaustive search on passwords will not get any bias on the actual password pw. So we have Prob[Encrypt] ≤ qS N . This yields the statement of the theorem. Table 1 compares our protocol and Bresson et al.'s password-based group key agreement protocol (BCP) [13] where the following notations are used-n and R are the total number of users in a group and total number of rounds respectively; BL is the maximum bit length of encrypted messages sent per user, PTP, Exp, Mul, Div respectively stands for maximum number of point-topoint communications, modular exponentiations, modular multiplications and divisions computed per user; Enc, Dec denote respectively the maximum number of symmetric key encryptions and decryptions performed per user; and |e| is the maximum size of an encrypted plaintext.
VII. Efficiency
Our protocol achieves efficiency in both communication and computation aspects as compared to other multiparty password-based key agreement protocol [13] . Our protocol requires only 2 rounds which makes our protocol efficient from communication point of view. Each user sends one message in each round. The maximum bit length of messages sent during protocol execution is at most 2|e| Each group member performs at most 3 modular exponentiations, 2n multiplications and/or divisions, 1 division, 2 encryptions and n + 1 decryptions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We address the problem of designing password-based authenticated key establishment protocols. A case study is made regarding the difficulties of convering a GKA protocol into password-based setting considering the DB protocol [15] -a variant of the constant round GKA protocol BD [14] , [22] . The protocol DB is finally enhanced into a password-based GKA which is proven to be secure against dictionary attack under DDH assumption in the ideal cipher model. We complement these results with a security analysis in the formal security model of Bellare et al. [6] following the work of Bresson et al. [13] .
